



**Kris Battleson**  
HSE Manager, Richmond Refinery

March 23, 2026

**Via E-mail**

Bay Area Air District  
Attn: Compliance and Enforcement Division  
375 Beale Street, Suite 600  
San Francisco, CA 94105

**Chevron Richmond Refinery  
January 2026 Flaring Causal Analysis Report**

To Whom It May Concern:

Attached is the flaring causal analysis report for January 2026 for Chevron's Richmond Refinery. This report is submitted pursuant to Regulation 12, Rule 12, Section 12-12-406. The report is due within 60 days of the end of January 2026 for any reportable flaring events that occurred during the month of January 2026.

There were two (2) reportable flaring events that occurred in January 2026.

If you have any questions, please contact Luke Honnen at 510-242-5271 or [Luke.Honnen@chevron.com](mailto:Luke.Honnen@chevron.com).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Kris Battleson".

for

Kris Battleson

**Attachment**

cc: Danny Fung, Bay Area Air District (via e-mail, w/ attach)  
Cristobal Frias, Bay Area Air District (via e-mail, w/ attach)  
Chris Coelho, Bay Area Air District (via e-mail, w/ attach)  
Haley Downing, Bay Area Air District (via e-mail, w/ attach)

**Richmond Refinery**  
**Chevron Products Company**  
A Division of Chevron U.S.A. Inc.  
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801  
Tel (510) 242-1400 Fax (510) 242-3762

**Attachment I**

Causal Analysis Report

Chevron Richmond Refinery  
Reportable Flaring Events

January 9, 2026  
Flaring Due to External Power Outage

## Refinery Flare Event – Cause Investigation Report

**1. Date on which the report was drafted:** March 23, 2026

**2. The refinery name and site number:**

Refinery: Chevron Richmond Refinery

Refinery Site Number: A0010

**3. The assigned refinery contact name and phone number:**

Contact Name: Luke Honnen

Contact Phone Number: (510) 242-5271

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Is this a rescission/modification of a previous report: No

Date of initial report: Not Applicable

Reason for rescission/modification: Not Applicable

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**4. Identification of flare(s) at which the reportable event occurred by reviewing water seal monitoring data to determine which seals were breached during the event**

| Flare         | Reportable Event (SO2 or Vent Gas Volume) |
|---------------|---|
| H2 (S-6021)   | Vent Gas Volume                           |
| RLOP (S-6039) | SO2                                       |
| FCC (S-6016)  | SO2                                       |
| LSFO (S-6010) | Vent Gas Volume                           |

**5. The flaring event duration for each affected flare**

| Flare (Source Number) | Event Date    | Start Time       | End Time         |
|-----------------------|---------------|------------------|------------------|
| H2 (S-6021)           | 09-January-26 | 01/09/2026 07:24 | 01/09/2026 13:24 |
| RLOP (S-6039)         | 09-January-26 | 01/09/2026 07:15 | 01/09/2026 08:44 |
| FCC (S-6016)          | 09-January-26 | 01/09/2026 07:15 | 01/09/2026 08:43 |
| LSFO (S-6010)         | 09-January-26 | 01/09/2026 07:11 | 01/09/2026 15:21 |
| ALKY (S-6019)*        | 09-January-26 | 01/09/2026 07:15 | 01/09/2026 08:10 |
| SISO (S-6012)*        | 09-January-26 | 01/09/2026 07:15 | 01/09/2026 08:13 |
| NISO (S-6013)*        | 09-January-26 | 01/09/2026 07:36 | 01/09/2026 08:20 |

*\*Reporting per recommendation from Bay Area Air District to include vent gas volume and emission from the other flares occurring during the same flaring event.*

**6. A brief description of the flaring event:**

The Chevron Richmond Refinery receives external electrical supply from two power lines operated by a regional utility provider. On January 8, 2026, the utility provider removed one of those lines from service for maintenance, placing the Richmond Refinery on single line feed. On January 9, 2026, the active external electrical line experienced a sudden fault, triggering a transfer trip and disconnecting the Refinery from the external electrical supply. This disconnection activated the

electrical load shed system - a system designed to protect equipment and prevent any safety risks or hazards - resulting in loss of power to the Richmond Refinery and process gases being sent to the relief system. Flaring began at approximately 07:11 AM. Flaring stopped on January 9, 2026 at approximately 03:21 PM.

**7. A process flow diagram showing the equipment and process units that were the primary cause of the event.**

See Attachment Ia.

**8. The total volume of vent gas flared (MMSCF) and emissions throughout the event per calendar day:**

| Flare (Source Number) | Event Date    | Volume (mmscf) | CH4 (lbs.) | NMHC (lbs.) | SO2 (lbs.) |
|-----------------------|---------------|----------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| H2 (S-6021)           | 09-January-26 | 1.98           | 574        | 253         | 2.15       |
| RLOP (S-6039)         | 09-January-26 | 0.383          | 15.0       | 142.4       | 1,958.3    |
| FCC (S-6016)          | 09-January-26 | 0.364          | 22.8       | 501.5       | 857.1      |
| LSFO (S-6010)         | 09-January-26 | 2.18           | 779.1      | 3,671.6     | 27.3       |
| ALKY (S-6019)*        | 09-January-26 | 0.0132         | 0.8        | 16.2        | 27.5       |
| SISO (S-6012)*        | 09-January-26 | 0.125          | 12.7       | 70.1        | 197.9      |
| NISO (S-6013)*        | 09-January-26 | 0.0286         | 1.4        | 22.4        | 64.9       |

*\*Reporting per recommendation from Bay Area Air District to include vent gas volume and emission from the other flares occurred during the same flaring event.*

**9. A statement as to whether or not the gas was scrubbed to eliminate or reduce any entrained compounds and a list of the compounds for which the scrubbing was performed.**

The vent gas was not scrubbed to eliminate or reduce any entrained compounds.

**10. The primary cause of the flaring event including a detailed description of the cause and all contributing factors. Also identify the upstream process units that contributed vent Gas flow to the flare header and provide other flow instrumentation data where available.**

Primary causal factor: The fault experienced by an external electrical utility line.

The primary contributor of the vent gas to the flare was multiple operating plants.

**11. Describe all immediate corrective actions to stabilize the flaring event, and to reduce or eliminate emissions (flare gas recovered or stored to minimize flaring during the event). If a decision was made not to store or recover flare gas, explain why.**

Operations responded immediately, communicating with the utility provider and systematically restoring power to impacted portions of the refinery.

**12. Was the flaring the result of an emergency? If so, was the flaring necessary to prevent an accident, hazard or release to the atmosphere?**

Flaring was due to sudden external power curtailment not involving an interruptible power service agreement, an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the Air District. Flaring was necessary to prevent the release of uncombusted vent gas to the atmosphere.

**13. If not the result of an emergency and necessary to prevent an accident, hazard or release to the atmosphere, was the flaring consistent with an approved FMP? If yes, provide a citation to the facility's FMP and any explanation necessary to understand the basis for this determination.**

N/A. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the Air District.

**14. If the flaring was due to a regulatory mandate to vent to flare, why couldn't the gas be recovered, treated, and used as fuel gas?**

N/A. Flaring was not due to a regulatory mandate.

**15. Identify and describe in detail each prevention measure (PM) considered to minimize flaring from the type of reportable flaring event that occurred.**

**a) State whether the PM is feasible (and will be implemented), or not feasible**

**b) Explain why the PM is not feasible, if applicable**

Flaring cannot be prevented during a sudden loss of external power supply due to facility and relief system design. Operational activities were consistent with emergency shutdown procedures.

## Attachment Ia: Flaring Due to External Power Outage

