BAAQMD received on 08/27/26

Kris Battleson
HSE Manager, Richmond Refinery

August 25, 2026

Via E-mail

Bay Area Air District
Attn: Compliance and Enforcement Division
375 Beale Street, Suite 600
San Francisco, CA 94105

Chevron Richmond Refinery
June 2026 Flaring Causal Analysis Report

To Whom It May Concern:

Attached is the flaring causal analysis report for June 2026 for Chevron's Richmond Refinery. This report is submitted pursuant to Regulation 12, Rule 12, Section 12-12-406. The report is due within 60 days of the end of June 2026 for any reportable flaring events that occurred during the month of June 2026.

There was one (1) reportable flaring event that occurred in June 2026.

If you have any questions, please contact Sophie O'Shields at 832-873-4681 or Sophie.OShields@chevron.com.

Sincerely,

for
Kris Battleson

Attachment

cc: Danny Fung, Bay Area Air District (via e-mail, w/ attach)
Cristobal Frias, Bay Area Air District (via e-mail, w/ attach)
Chris Coelho, Bay Area Air District (via e-mail, w/ attach)
Haley Downing, Bay Area Air District (via e-mail, w/ attach)

Richmond Refinery
Chevron Products Company
A Division of Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
841 Chevron Way, Richmond, CA 94801
Tel (510) 242-1400 Fax (510) 242-3762

Attachment I

Causal Analysis Report

Chevron Richmond Refinery
Reportable Flaring Events

June 20, 2026
Flaring Due to Malfunction of Compressor Electrical Component

Refinery Flare Event – Cause Investigation Report

1. Date on which the report was drafted: August 25, 2026

2. The refinery name and site number:

Refinery: Chevron Richmond Refinery
Refinery Site Number: A0010

3. The assigned refinery contact name and phone number:

Contact Name: Sophie O'Shields
Contact Phone Number: (832) 873-4681

Is this a rescission/modification of a previous report: No

Date of initial report: Not Applicable

Reason for rescission/modification: Not Applicable

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4. Identification of flare(s) at which the reportable event occurred by reviewing water seal monitoring data to determine which seals were breached during the event

Flare	Reportable Event (SO2 or Vent Gas Volume)
FCC (S-6016)	SO2 and Vent Gas Volume

5. The flaring event duration for each affected flare

Flare (Source Number)	Event Date	Start Time	End Time
FCC (S-6016)	20-June-26	06/20/2026 13:19	06/20/2026 18:34
RLOP (6039)*	20-June-26	06/20/2026 13:12	06/20/2026 14:27
ALKY (6019)*	20-June-26	06/20/2026 13:09	06/20/2026 22:27
NISO (6013)*	20-June-26	06/20/2026 13:09	06/20/2026 16:23
SISO (6012)*	20-June-26	06/20/2026 13:09	06/20/2026 16:28

**Reporting per recommendation from Bay Area Air District to include vent gas volume and emission from the other flares occurring during the same flaring event.*

6. A brief description of the flaring event:

On June 20, 2026, a hydrogen recycle compressor tripped offline due to an unprecedented and unpredictable electrical malfunction of the compressor's lube oil pump. Immediately upon the loss of the compressor, two adjacent compressors increased their capacity to manage the excess gas in the system that the impacted compressor was no longer able to process. Despite additional compressors increasing their load, excess gas was routed to the FCC flare and resulted in a flaring event. Once the electric component was identified as causing the malfunction, operations personnel performed a hard reset and brought the equipment back online. This ended the flaring event.

7. A process flow diagram showing the equipment and process units that were the primary cause of the event.

Attachment I

See Attachment I.

8. The total volume of vent gas flared (MMSCF) and emissions throughout the event per calendar day:

Flare (Source Number)	Event Date	Volume (mmscf)	CH4 (lbs.)	NMHC (lbs.)	SO2 (lbs.)
FCC (S-6016)	20-June-26	0.74	28.14	846.46	1,042.38
RLOP (6039)*	20-June-26	0.03	2.06	20.25	55.19
ALKY (6019)*	20-June-26	0.06	2.14	50.90	19.04
NISO (6013)*	20-June-26	0.46	6.92	250.56	312.20
SISO (6012)*	20-June-26	0.39	11.44	116.82	92.89

**Reporting per recommendation from Bay Area Air District to include vent gas volume and emission from the other flares occurred during the same flaring event.*

9. A statement as to whether or not the gas was scrubbed to eliminate or reduce any entrained compounds and a list of the compounds for which the scrubbing was performed.

The vent gas was not scrubbed to eliminate or reduce any entrained compounds.

10. The primary cause of the flaring event including a detailed description of the cause and all contributing factors. Also identify the upstream process units that contributed vent Gas flow to the flare header and provide other flow instrumentation data where available.

The primary cause of this flaring event was a malfunction of the electrical component on the compressor's lube oil pump.

11. Describe all immediate corrective actions to stabilize the flaring event, and to reduce or eliminate emissions (flare gas recovered or stored to minimize flaring during the event). If a decision was made not to store or recover flare gas, explain why.

Operations personnel responded to the compressor trip immediately by preparing additional compressors to manage the excess gas and troubleshooting the cause of the compressor trip. This quick action mitigated as much gas as possible from flowing to the flare.

12. Was the flaring the result of an emergency? If so, was the flaring necessary to prevent an accident, hazard or release to the atmosphere?

Flaring was due to an infrequent and not reasonably preventable equipment failure, an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the Air District. Flaring was necessary to prevent the release of uncombusted vent gas to the atmosphere. Attachment I.

13. If not the result of an emergency and necessary to prevent an accident, hazard or release to the atmosphere, was the flaring consistent with an approved FMP? If yes, provide a citation to the facility's FMP and any explanation necessary to understand the basis for this determination.

N/A. Flaring was due to an Emergency (defined in Regulation 12-12-201) as interpreted by the Air District.

14. If the flaring was due to a regulatory mandate to vent to flare, why couldn't the gas be recovered, treated, and used as fuel gas?

Attachment I

N/A. Flaring was not due to a regulatory mandate.

15. Identify and describe in detail each prevention measure (PM) considered to minimize flaring from the type of reportable flaring event that occurred.
a. State whether the PM is feasible (and will be implemented), or not feasible
b. Explain why the PM is not feasible, if applicable

The electrical component that malfunctioned will be replaced with a newer model by the same manufacturer.

Attachment I: Flaring Due to Malfunction